The paper studies a general equilibrium in an economy where all market participants face a bid-ask spread. The spread may be caused by indirect business taxes, middlemen rentseeking, delays in payments or liquidity constraints or price uncertainty. Wherever it comes from the spread causes inefficiency of the market equilibrium. We discuss some institutions that can decrease the inefficiency. One is second currency (barter exchange) in the inter-firm transactions. It is shown that the general equilibrium in an economy with second currency is effective though is still different from Arrow-Debreu equilibrium. Another solution can be introduction of mutual trade credit. In the economy with trade credit there are multiple equilibria that are more efficient than original bid-ask spread but still not as efficient as Arrow-Debreu one, too. The implications for firms' integration and applicability to Russian economy are discussed.
INTRODUCTION
The transition to market economy happening now in more than twenty countries all over the world is one of the most important current economic developments. In most countries the reform has been designed along lines suggested by the International Monetary Fund according to which the government should first liberalize prices, then balance budget in order to achieve financial stabilization Corresponding author. 281 which is necessary (and almost sufficient) condition for investment and therefore economic recovery and growth. Some economies have quickly passed the periods of inflation and financial stabilization and have made sustained turnarounds to growth.
Yet, in others (especially in former Soviet Union countries) the financial stabilization is achieved but the economic recovery has not yet begun. In However the growth has not been observed yet the recent period is characterized by stable or slowly declining GDP. It is not the purpose of this paper to provide an answer why there is no growth. Rather, we shall try to suggest a theory that describes the economy at the present stage combining in a static general equilibrium model several issues such as:
Inefficiency of market equilibrium Although Russian economy has been significantly liberalized and almost all price controls are abandoned, the first welfare theorem does not apply. Both objective and .subjective measures of welfare are reported to decrease by tens of percents compared with pre-reform standards (Goskomstat, 1992; 1993; 1996) . (R) Huge nonmonetary transactions Since mid-95 when the Russian government has tightened the money supply, firms' managers complain about desperate shortage of working capital. In this period, various money substitutes have emerged such as firms' and banks' IOUs and promissory notes, treasury notes etc. Being used extensively in inter-firm transactions, these financial instruments have been referred to as 'quasi-money'. It is not uncommon for a firm's (and to a greater extent for a bank's) IOU to change several hands before being accepted by the issuer.** Also a lot of firms are engaged in barter exchanges. It is hard to estimate the volume of nonmonetary transactions. The reports vary from 30% to 80% of inter-firm turnover (Delyagin, 1997; Klepach, 1997; Makarov and Kleiner, 1997) . Note that increase in nonmonetary transactions does not mean actual GDP growth these are almost exclusively used in the inter-firm sales. r Neplatezhi (nonpayments and unde payments of firms to each other, arrears) Although the neplatezhi have been first perceived as an evil of high inflation they still persisted in the recent time and actually rose up to 25% GDP (Goskomstat, 1997) . Integration In the present Russian economy one can clearly see the urge of firms and banks to integrate. Moreover the success of some consortia established formally or informally is quite noticeable. Certainly, this is not transitionspecific but still very important.
The welfare theorems claim that under perfect competition the market economy first provides best allocation of factors of production. This feature of perfect competition market is the consequence of basic assumption that for each good there is a single market price so that marginal cost will be equal to marginal utility.
We depart from this assumption building a model in which there is a bid-ask spread every market participant faces. The nature of this bid-ask spread may be different. While building appliedgeneral equilibrium models in transition economy in recent years (see Petrov et al., 1996) we have often discovered situations in which this spread, wherever it stems from, is significant. In Section 3 we point out some of these examples.
In the presence of the spread, one should expect the general equilibrium to be inefficient. We believe that introduction of quasi-money, barter and underpayment (that we consider to be a system of mutual credit) transactions between firms decrease the inefficiency caused by the spread.
In some sense the paper follows the main idea of new institutional economics, in particular, the transaction costs economics (Coase, 1984; Williamson, 1987) . We believe that if there can be institutions (namely barter and underpayments) to decrease the inefficiency of equilibria, such institutions should emerge. There is certain general equilibrium literature that analyzes the structure of financial markets (e.g. Bisin, 1997) purchases of the firm on these markets (see Fig. 1 ). In a closed economy sales and purchases of agents in each market should be in a balance:
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We consider static economy, i.e. economy without growth of capital. It meets the present situation in Russia where as is known, the industrial investments ensuring growth are so insignificant that hardly cover capital depreciation.
We assume working capital in the form of raw materials, fuel etc. to be the only limiting factor of production. It also meets the modern Russian economy where constant capital labor and natural resources are in excess supply.
These two assumptions allow to describe production possibilities of a firm u by constant technological set T. Each vector z-{z,..., zn} T corresponds to some possible combination of production inputs and outputs. Positive component of vector z represents net output of corresponding good, negative component represents net input. Following the neoclassic theory of production we assume T" to be strictly convex, closed and compact. We also require that a firm cannot produce anything without expenditures but can produce nothing without expenditures (z _> 0 and z z-0). The last is not so trivial as it may seem. For doing nothing some of Russian industrial enterprises have to spend on heating, lighting and so on, up to one-third of expenditures they pay working at full capacity. x/y-v'-w_<z, x,y,v , _>0;
Comparison of (3) with (1) and (2) shows that all possible vectors of consumption lie in the aggregate technological set We assume that 0 is internal point of T i.e. the economy as a whole can produce positive quantity of all goods for final consumption.
General equilibrium is purified description of the result of self-adjustment of a market economy. It is defined by four basic hypothesis which, for our model, have the following form:
Consumers maximize utility of consumption under budget constraint.
U(e)max over e_>0 subject to pc_<I,
where I is the total income (budget) of consumers and p= {p,... ,Pn} is a vector of consumer prices of goods. The solution of the problem (5) determines aggregate demand which will be a function of prices, e e(p,I).
Each firm u maximizes its net real income (profit) P under technological constraint (3)" P" max over x , y", v", w", z" subject to (3).
'Invisible hand' of market puts prices at the level balancing demand and supply so that (1), (2) will hold.
Income I of consumers should be equal to total net nominal income of producers (Walras law) (px pv") I pc.
We start with perfect competition case (ArrowDebreu economy, see for example Nikaido, 1968 ) which we will take as a benchmark. Under perfect competition each good costs the same price for any agent in any transaction. In particular the prices in the inter-firm market are the same as at consumer market and net income of the firm u is P px pv + py pw . (9) General competitive equilibrium in our model is the state of economy {p Pc, I-Ic, e ec, x" x;, y'J y, v v, w" w;, z z:} which satisfies
(1), (2), (5) and (8) providing that x , y", v", w",z" maximize (9) subject to (3). Maximization of (9) We will refer this state of economy as C-equilibrium.
The definition above characterizes equilibrium in a local, decentralized way as a balance of rational decision made be independent agents. It is easy to characterize C-equilibrium globally from the view point of the whole system. Maximization of (9) by x turns inequality in (3) into equality z -x + y v" w" and P becomes equal to pcz. Further maximization of profit by z over T" determines z: as the only boundary point of T with normal vector Pc. Sum of these points over u gives ec (see (4)) which will be the boundary point of T with the same normal vector Pc. On the other hand the solution of (5) requires that Pc be proportional to the gradient of utility function U at ec. The only point where normality to T is proportional to the gradient of U is the point ec where U reaches its maximum value over the whole T. This gives global characterization of C-equilibrium.
Equilibrium prices are simply the vector normal to T at ec. According to (10) sales x and purchases v are determined uniquely as positive and negative parts of previously found z. Multiplication of (1) by Pc shows that (8) ciency. Being in effective equilibrium, economy will completely use current production factors and must feel the lack of either labor, or fixed capital, or natural resources. Such economy will demonstrate some tendency to investments.
We do not see any will to invest in modern Russian economy. On the contrary, we hear complaints on desperate shortage of current production factors. It induces on an idea, that in Russian economy some inefficient equilibrium is realized.
INEFFECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM WITH BID-ASK SPREAD (BA-EQUILIBRIUM)
The C-equilibrium effective due to the fact that all agents estimate any good by the same price. Now we depart from this hypothesis and consider economy where market participants face bid-ask spread i.e. buyer ofsome good pays more than its seller receives. Let us first provide some examples of economic relationships in which the difference between buying pb and selling pS prices emerges.
1. Excises." The simplest example is sales tax or excise. Let market price of some good be p and the tax rate set at n percent. If it is the seller who pays the tax the price for buyer is still pb __p while the price for seller is only pS (1 n)p. If the tax is paid by buyer then pb (1 + n)p and pS p.
5We mean under equilibrium in the general plan the coordination ofvolumes ofproduction and consumption in economy by means of special information variables (usually prices).
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S. GURIEV AND I. POSPELOV 2. Middlemen profit." In a competitive economy the difference between purchasing and selling prices of trade intermediaries is a reward for trade services that should increase the consumer value of the good. It is thus possible to consider trade services as a special good produced by middlemen. Then there should be no bid-ask spread. However the price differentials in Russian trade are so high and the corruption and racket are so common that it is rather reasonable to assume that most of the price differentials is rather rent than normal profit. This rent is received by those in ownership or control of the sales channels: corrupted bureaucrats, organized crime and managers abusing their firms' interests. Such view makes the price differentials in trade similar to taxes. e-e(e-')g({) d.
Here 5 is pure time preference rate which may be interpreted as a reciprocal to average planning horizon (see e.g. Blanchard and Fischer, 1989) . It is easy to show (see Pospelov, 1995) that if the firm expects prices to be constant over time p()=p(t), q()=q(t), the level of production (inputs V and outputs X) should be set to maximize (50P(t)X-q(t) V (12) + rather than profitp(t)X-q(t)V. This actually means that the producer evaluates the product at price pS _p(1 + 50) and leads to lower level of both inputs and outputs. This result may seem counterintuitive since under constant prices the cash holdings M do not change and the instantaneous cash inflow or withdrawn earnings equals profit rather than (12). The point is that by decreasing both input and output the firm is able to withdraw some cash and this one-time withdrawal can overweight discounted permanent increase in cash inflows in future. Withdrawing money a firm then will explain underproduction by shortage of money.
There is a lot of direct and indirect evidence that many entrepreneurs in Russian as well as other transition economies look at short-term perspective so that discount rate may be quite large. Meanwhile, the liquidity constraints are also reported to be very restrictive as they should be in the absence of well developed working capital market. Both factors increase importance of this effect. Demers, 1990) .
The examples of bid-ask spread given above can be described as follows. We again assume that there are some market prices p the same for both markets. However due to the reasons above the objective function of firm does not equal (9) Both gross sales and gross expenses at BAequilibrium will be less if compared with Cequilibrium:
XA < x, VA < ; V.
BA-equilibrium is placed within the set T to the left-bottom of C-equilibrium (point 'BA' in Fig. 2 ).
Generally speaking, the inefficiency not always means smaller than in C-equilibrium issues and expenses. Studying mechanisms of functioning of a centrally planned economy (Petrov et al., 1996) , we came to a conclusion that it may be described by a specific P-equilibrium. P-equilibrium is characterized by shortage of goods of normal quality, overproduction and excessive inter-firm transactions.
This 'P-equilibrium' is represented by point 'P' on #It may be proved by standard way using well Known Gale's lemma (see Nikaido, 1968) . Russia has passed by the desired point 'C' and from inefficient planning 'P' to the inefficient market 'BA'.
EQUILIBRIUM WITH BARTER EXCHANGE OR SECOND CURRENCY (B-EQUILIBRIUM)
The losses of enterprises in BA-equilibrium are connected with money payments. So one could expect emergence of compensating mechanisms, reducing money transactions. In Russia two such mechanisms are steadily observed. They are barter and nonpayments (actually underpayments). Usually the problems of barter and nonpayments are treated as one. We will separately address the issues and will show that the equilibria in these two cases are very different and hence deserve different treatments. We start with more simple case of a barter exchange. Certainly we study the idealized barter just as we considered the idealized case of perfect competition above.
Our first assumption of barter exchange is that it takes place only in the second inter-firm market which was actually put aside as above. On the other hand if a firm wishes to sell or to buy for money it should go to the first market where it still faces transaction costs A and B. So the vectors y and w" represent sales and purchases of the firm u by barter transactions. Restriction (3) does not exclude pure gamble when the enterprise buys some goods by barter not for manufacturing but to sell it for money or quite conversely.
Our second assumption is that there exists single set of barter exchange ratios (barter prices) q= {ql,..., qn} in the inter-firm market and any barter transaction is fair if measured in these prices: qy qw . (14) This condition may be treated as budget constraint (balance sheet of account) of the firm for the second currency (compare with budget constraint of consumers in (5)). The second currency is of no interest for fiscal institutions and racketeers, so there is no transaction cost. The second currency is actually emitted by a firm when it is necessary so that no liquidity constraint occurs (see (11)). Barter exchanges contribute nothing to firm's income, hence firm's behavior may be described as maximization of P pAx pBv (15) subject to (3) and (14) .
Note that Walras law for usual money (8) still holds. Moreover summation of (14) over u states Walras law for second currency too.
General equilibrium with barter exchange in our model is the state of economy P--PB, q--qB, I--IB, C--CB, We will refer this state of economy as B-equilibrium.
Maximization of P determines supply and demand of firms in both markets as a function of two systems of prices: p and q. Relations (1) and (2) give two systems of equations for these prices.
Barter prices may be excluded by the following trick. Consider all firms as one enterprise seeking to maximize the total profit PB (pAx pBv) (16) under given prices p subject to individual constraints (3) and common balance constraint on **Here we need not exclude sales to itself (see (10) The efficiency of B-equilibrium seems to point out that the well organized legalized barter could be capable of solving a problem of bid-ask spread. However closer consideration of the second and third properties shows fatal defects of the barter mechanism.
Consider a firm which does not produce goods of consumer demand. According to the third property such a firm cannot sell its output for money in Bequilibrium. If we ask a question, how this firm could get money, the answer is that in B-equilibrium the firm which cannot produce goods of consumer will have positive income. It will exchange its output on goods of consumer demand by barter and then resell the latter for money.
Thus, barter actually reduces to commodity money (gold, petrol, vodka Fig. 2 by arrows at point 'B'. On the one hand cheap credit removing liquidity constraints reduces inefficiency according to Error! Reference source not found, Section 3; on the other hand pushing forward inflation cheap credit increases inefficiency according to Section 3.
The end result of these opposite tendencies may be characterized as follows. If distortion of economy is slight (point 'B' is near to 'C' on Fig. 2 ) and hence growth of production does not increase utility of consumption the negative effect dominates and one should expect further development according to monetarist reasoning: additional money push inflation which suppresses production. If distortion is serious (point 'B' is far from 'C' on Fig. 2 ) and growth of production would be desirable for consumers the positive effect dominates and development will correspond Keinsian reasoning: additional money stimulate production in spite of inflation.
Moreover models predict possibility of the socalled 'deflation shock'. When crisis is deep (point 'B' is far from 'C' on Fig. 2 ) the tight credit policy suppress production so that output falls faster than money mass and inflation even grows. Some Russian economists, in particular G. Yavlinsky spoke of repeated deflation shocks in Russia in spring of 1992, 1993 and 1994 . Experiments with our model confirm this opinion (Petrov et al., 1996) .
Questions above are undoubtedly an interesting and urgent subject for further research.
EQUILIBRIUM WITH ARREARS OR MUTUAL CREDIT OF ENTERPRISES (A-EQUILIBRIUM)
Notorious nonpayments (underpayments, arrears, inter-firm defaults) widely spread in Russian economy represent alternative to barter mechanism of reducing money payments. While perfect competition market is investigated completely and barter mechanisms are rather transparent, arrears remain questionable. There are only few works that provide formal models of the underpayments. While building such a model the economist faces at least one challenge. It is not hard to explain why the buyer is not able (or willing) to pay the full price. It is less evident how to explain why the seller agrees to sell at a lower price and if he does why pay him at all?
We are aware of several answers to this question.
The most apparent one is described in Grigoriev, 1997. It essentially relies upon assumption of imperfect competition and suggests that the seller needs to discriminate buyers by prices for which the underpayments are a convenient instrument. The paper solves for equilibrium in case of asymmetric information so the underpayments are used as screening device in a principal/agent model. The drawback of the model is the exogenous parameter that measures the danger of being too indebted (probability of being announced insolvent). This means the model does not deal with the other key point of the payment crisis: If the seller agrees to sell at lower prices why to pay at all?
The other approach (Perotti, 1994; Pospelov, 1995) assumes some corporate (or, should one say, collusive) spirit that firms as a whole possess. In these models the Firms use the underpayments as an instrument for getting low-interest credit from outside lenders such as government. Being indebted the firm expects that the government is going to help and provide some cheap money. This case did take place in 1992-94. The key point here is that it is the buyer who gets the cheap money and it is the seller who is underpaid. However every firm is both a buyer and a seller in some transactions so the externality issue is resolved by cooperative behavior. Then, there is a couple of papers that use general equilibrium models. The advantage of general equilibrium approach is obvious since in an economy with inter-firm arrears the partial equilibrium clearly misses certain some important points. The INEFFICIENT EQUILIBRIA IN TRANSITION ECONOMY   291 paper by Kim and Kwon, 1995 suggests a general equilibrium model of an economy with rigid technological structure. There are n firms with linear production technology and working capital as limiting factor. The firm buys from firm iand supplies to firm + and is subject to a firmspecific productivity shocks. Although our model is much less sophisticated than one by Kim and Kwon (1995) with uncertainty and dynamic setting, our analysis is more general in the sense that we do not make any special assumptions about the production sets beyond conventional ones. In Granville et al. (1996) all firms act under given rate of underpayments and given exogenous parameter of disutility of being indebted like the one described above. Then the underpayment rate is to be determined from equilibrium conditions.
Our model is similar to the later works though we explicitly state to which extent firms accept underpayments and allow different levels of underpayments for different goods (which really happens). Our approach is also compatible with the idea of corporate behavior but does not take into account monopolistic aspects.
Our answer to the question above is that a firm sells at lower price in order to be able to buy at lower price. A firm explains to its suppliers that it cannot pay because consumers did not pay to it.
We assume arrears are allowed only in inter-firm market. The stronger assumption is that there exist constant rates of underpayment for each good ;--{S1,...,$2} same for all firms. Nominal price in inter-firm market are p, but actually a firm pays for unit of good only Pi-si (1), (2), (5) and (8) providing that x", y", v, w", z" maximize (18) subject to (3) and (17). Since both markets face participants against transaction costs no additional conditions are required. We will refer this state of economy as A-equilibrium.
Investigation of A-equilibrium requires specific mathematical technique. A-equilibrium exists but, contrary to C-, BA-, and B-equilibrium considered above, occurs to be essentially not unique.
Of course one may multiply IA, SA, IA by a common positive factor not breaking A-equilibrium because it is equivalent to changing of currency unit. But one cannot scale SA independently on PA like in B-equilibrium because SA should remain less than lA or maximization of (18) will generate infinite demand and equilibrium will be broken. On the other hand conditions of Aequilibrium like conditions of B-equilibrium do not suffice to determine second prices by given first prices p uniquely. Fig. 2 ).
This line begins with BA-equilibrium which is a particular case of A-equilibrium at SA 0 and come to its end at some point where one of the components of SA becomes equal to corresponding component of PA.
All these A-equilibria are ineffective (lie within ). However calculations made with abstract data show that the line of A-equilibria in the beginning (at small SA) goes toward C-equilibrium then close to boundary of i?, turns abruptly toward Bequilibrium and only after that ends within i? (see The model have been developed by the order of Regional Senior Management of Central Bank of Russia. This model nowadays is well verified. It reproduces dynamics of more than 50 basic indicators of regional economy with correlation more than 75% and accuracy less than 10%. The principal scheme of the model will be published in Guriev et al., 1998 . This model, in particular, takes into account underpayments and reaction of enterprises on them according to the scheme considered above. The regional economy is opened and prices on regional market are not determined by regional demand and supply. Prices as well as rates of underpayments are exogenous parameters of the model of regional economy. However it is possible to examine change of economic indicators depending of rate of underpayments. Figure 3 represents one of such results.
Each point in Fig. 3 At the same time A-balance is deprived of the basic faults of equilibrium with barter (B-equilibrium): there is actually only one scale of prices and enterprises which is not producing goods of consumers' demand receive their income by sales oftheir own production and not by reselling of another's.
For these reasons we may suppose that underpayments being legalized, i.e. transformed in the lawful mutual credit of the enterprises, could serve as a suitable means to overcome systematic shortage of working capital in Russian economy.
INEFFICIENCY OF THE MARKET AS STIMULUS TO INTEGRATION OF THE ENTERPRISES
In the case of perfect competition (C-equilibrium, Section 2) firms have no stimuli to integrate. Well known theorem of the core of economy (Nikaido, 1968) states that no group of firms in C-equilibrium could increase their total profit by reallocation of resources within the group. This is not true in the case of A-equilibrium. Reallocating of resources besides market firms can avoid transaction cost. It is necessary, however, always to mean, that pure administrative association of large number of the enterprises will face problem.s like those of a planned economy. In modern conditions of a powerful external competition, such group most likely will be compelled to organize internal systems of accounts and economic stimuli, i.e. internal submarket. Then at the end association be reduced to one of models of equilibrium but with the solidary financial responsibility of group, i.e. financial-industrial group (FPG). Payment crisis in Russian economy cannot be resolved by mechanical injection of money in economy since all ineffective equilibria considered above are invariant to price scaling. The injection of money only will cause inflation but barter and arrears will be quickly restored at a new level.
Proper institualization and legalization of quasimoney may help to overcome payment crisis. The mechanism of mutual crediting is preferable as compared with mechanism of barter exchange as latter has a lot of serious internal faults. Institualization of the mutual credit is in essence a function of banks. However to execute this function properly banks they should rise reliability and essentially decrease discount rate of promissory notes at the expense of expansion of sphere of circulation of these securities.
